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Education: The Constitutionality of Oklahoma's
Public School Financing System: Does the State
Have a Duty to Provide an Adequate Education for
All Schoolchildren?
In the last two decades, educational reform has become an increasingly
important issue not only in the political arena, but also in the judiciary.
Educators and politicians alike have questioned the effectiveness of existing
public school financing systems within the United States. Recognition of
the importance of providing adequate educational opportunities for all of
the nation's children has produced several challenges to state school fi-
nancing systems across the United States.
In recent years, Oklahoma has joined a large group of other states whose
school financing systems have been legally challenged by disgruntled school
districts, educators, and parents.' The purpose of this note is to review the
existing school funding system in Oklahoma and to analyze the most recent
legal challenges to the constitutionality of Oklahoma's financing system.
This note first discusses recent developments in school finance litigation in
other states. That discussion includes a review of the different ways in
which varying state courts and legislatures have responded to the issue of
providing adequate or equal educational opportunities for children in public
schools.
Second, this note focuses on the present status of Oklahoma's educational
system, including recent political and legislative reform. Next, this note
reviews school finance litigation in Oklahoma, including a recent action
which challenges the constitutional validity of the existing school financing
system. 2 Finally, the note analyzes the major issues which should be ad-
dressed by the court in this recently-filed case and the possible judicial and
legislative responses to those issues.
L Developments in School Finance Litigation
Varying degrees of educational reform have occurred in many states over
the past several decades. Much of state legislative reform has been instigated
as a result of lawsuits filed by parents and educators concerned about the
1. See Dupree v. Alma School Dist. No. 30, 279 Ark. 340, 651 S.W.2d 90 (1983); Serrano
v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971); Horton v. Meskill, 172
Conn. 615, 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1977); Rose v. Council for Better Education, 790 S.W.2d
186 (Ky. 1989); Helena Elementary School Dist. No. I v. State, 769 P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989);
Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973); Seattle
School Dist. No. I v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 585 P.2d 71 (1979); Pauley v. Kelly, 162 W.
Va. 672, 255 S.E.2d 859 (1979); Washakie County School Dist. No. 1 v. Herschler, 606 P.2d
310 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980).
2. Fair School Fin. Council v. Oklahoma, No. CJ-90-7165 (D. Okla. fied Sept. 6, 1990)
(Fair School 11).
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financial inequities existing among school districts. 3 The controversy and
legal debate over educational reform primarily concerns the extent to which
local, state, and federal governments are obligated to provide free public
educational opportunities to every child in the United States.
The importance of education in our society was recognized by the United
States Supreme Court in 1954 in Brown v. Board of Education.4 In Brown,
the Court recognized education as perhaps the most crucial function of state
and local governments.5 The Court reasoned that the enactment of com-
pulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education
demonstrate that democratic society places great importance on education.
6
The Court further stated that a child's future success in life is directly
related to that child's educational opportunities, and as a result, education
is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.
7
The concept of equal educational opportunity, stemming from Brown,
created much confusion among state and federal courts as to whether the
idea of equal opportunity should be applied in the context of school
financing. 8 Courts questioned whether the language in Brown could be
broadly interpreted to require states to provide for an equal distribution of
school funds among all school districts. 9 In both state and federal cases
involving challenge; to the constitutionality of school funding systems, one
of the basic arguments is that funding disparities between school districts
create unequal opportunities for students from land-poor districts.'
The United States Supreme Court ultimately resolved the issue of whether
education is a fundamental right subject to protection under the United
States Constitution in Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School Dis-
trict." Rodriguez acknowledged the crucial function that education has in
today's society. Nevertheless, the Court found that the fact that education
is important to society does not necessarily make education a fundamental
right.'2 Rodriguez stated that the key to resolving whether a fundamental
right exists is to determine whether the right is explicitly or implicitly
guaranteed by the Constitution. 3 The Court concluded that education is
not a right afforded either explicit or implicit protection under the Consti-
tution. 14
Rodriguez also upheld the validity of the use of local property taxes to
finance public schools.' 5 The Court found that, in spite of the fiscal ineq-
3. See generally Thompson, School Finance and the Courts - A Reanalysis of Progress,
59 Educ. L. Rep. (West) 945 (June 21, 1990).
4. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
5. Id. at 493.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. See generally Thompson, supra note 3.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
12. Id. at 30.
13. Id. at 33-34.
14. Id. at 35.




uities existing between various school districts, the use of local property
taxes was a reasonable method of furthering the goal of local control over
schools.
6
In upholding the constitutionality of the Texas school financing system,
the Court reasoned that a rational relationship existed between the funding
scheme and the state's interest in maintaining local control over education.
Rodriguez held that as long as this rational basis test is met, the existing
fiscal disparities between districts would not justify replacing local ad va-
lorem taxation as the primary method of financing education.
8
Rodriguez has had a significant impact on the evolution of school finance
litigation in the United States. Rodriguez conclusively established that any
future legal challenges to state school financing systems could not be pred-
icated on the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution. As
a result, subsequent lawsuits have been limited to challenging school funding
systems only on the basis of the construction of the various state consti-
tutions. 9
In addition, Rodriquez has been helpful in delineating the legal issues
and public policy considerations which must be reviewed by the state courts
facing constitutional challenges of school funding systems. Among the
important issues identified by Rodriguez are whether education is a fun-
damental right and whether maintaining local control over education is a
legitimate state purpose justifying the use of local property taxes to finance
public education. Those two issues have been consistently addressed by
many state courts in subsequent lawsuits 0 and are important for an under-
standing of the current school finance litigation in Oklahoma.
II. State Court Responses to School Financing Challenges
A. Equal Protection Guarantees
One of the first state courts to take the decisive step of requiring a state
legislature to enact statutory changes to a school financing system was the
California Supreme Court. In Serrano v. Priest,2' the court found that the
funding disparities existing between the California school districts were in
violation of the equal protection clause of the California constitution. 22 The
16. Id.
17. Id. at 55.
18. Id. at 44-55.
19. See generally Thompson, supra note 3.
20. See, e.g., Edgewood Indep. School Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989); Fair
School Fin. Council v. State, 746 P.2d 1135 (Okla. 1987) (Fair School 1).
21. Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1976) (Serrano
1).
22. Id., 557 P.2d at 958, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 373-74. In Serrano I, the California Supreme
Court ruled that if the plaintiff's allegations of inequities were true then the California system
of school finance violated the equal protection clauses of the California and United States
Constitutions. Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1244, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (Cal. 1971) (Serrano
1). Serrano I was decided before Rodriguez made it clear that maintaining local control over
education was a legitimate state purpose. Rodriguez made challenges of violations of the equal
protection clause of the United States Constitution very difficult. See Serrano II, 557 P.2d at
948, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 364.
1991]
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court subsequently ordered the state legislature to reduce spending disparities
to bring the funding system into compliance with the state constitution.
23
Serrano implied that equal opportunity guarantees mandated that education
funding not be conditioned on a student's residence, which might or might
not be in a highly taxed district where per-pupil spending is much greater
than in other districts.24
Based upon the judicial mandate in Serrano, the California legislature
enacted several significant changes to the school financing system.25 Those
legislative enactments were later reviewed by an appellate court and found
to be sufficient to bring the school financing system into compliance with
the California constitution.
26
Serrano represents an important development in school finance litigation
for several reasons. Of primary significance is the fact that the Serrano
court felt compelled to take an active role in improving California's edu-
cation system. By setting out specific measures and standards for attaining
an equitable school financing system, 27 the court assumed a quasi-legislative
role which arguably encroached upon legislative authority. Serrano illustrates
that despite the fact that the state legislature has the duty to create a system
of school finance, the judiciary has the responsibility to make sure that
state school financing systems meet constitutional standards.
Serrano also resulted in a highly centralized state system of schools in
California. 28 The legislative enactments mandated by Serrano required the
state to exert more influence over the distribution of funds to California
school districts. 29 A major criticism of Serrano has been that local control
over education was destroyed. In light of the fact that maintaining local
control over education has been considered one of the the primary objectives
of public education systems,30 Serrano represents a radical change in school
finance litigation.
Another important aspect of Serrano is the recognition of the improba-
bility of attaining absolute dollar for dollar equality in the distribution of
school funds because of differences in costs and needs among school dis-
tricts.3' Because of Serrano's acknowledgment that insignificant fiscal dis-
parities among school districts are justified by legitimate state interests,
32
the focus of future challenges to the California school finance system should
pass from equitable considerations to whether school districts can provide
an adequate level of education for all students.
3
23. Id.
24. See generally Thcmpson, supra note 3.
25. See generally Ward, Remedies in School Finance Equity Litigation, 36 Educ. L. Rep.
(West) 1 (1987).
26. Serrano v. Priest, 181 Cal. App. 3d 866, 226 Cal. Rptr. 584, 620 (1986).
27. Id., 226 Cal. Rptr. at 607-13.
28. See generally Ward, supra note 25.
29. Id.
30. See Rodriguez v. San Antonio Indep. School Dist., 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
31. Serrano v. Priest, 181 Cal. App. 3d 866, 226 Cal. Rptr. 584, 616 (1986).
32. Id., 226 Cal. Rptr. at 615.




B. "Efficiency" As A Constitutional Standard
Another approach to addressing the issue of disparities in funding between
school districts was taken in Edgewood Independent School District v.
Kirby.3 4 Edgewood declined to address the plaintiff's allegations that the
Texas system of school finance violated the equal protection clause of the
Texas constitution." Instead, the court found that the school funding system
violated a specific clause of the Texas constitution, which requires that the
legislature provide an "efficient" system of public schools.
3 6
Edgewood defined, in considerable detail, the term "efficient" as it was
used in the Texas constitution.37 The court concluded that the framers of
the state constitution, in declaring that the purpose of an efficient system
of education was to provide a "general diffusion of knowledge," did not
intend for large funding disparities among school districts to be considered
"efficient.""
The court's reluctance to base its decision on the Texas constitution's
equal protection clause might be explained by the court's recognition that
efficiency does not mean absolute equality. The court acknowledged that a
per capita distribution of funds is not a requirement of the efficiency
provision of the state constitution.39 Nevertheless, the court clearly stated
that "efficiency" does not allow concentrations of resources in property-
rich school districts when other districts cannot even raise sufficient revenues
to meet minimal educational standards.
40
In finding the Texas school financing system unconstitutional, the Edge-
wood court made a specific point of stating that it would not encroach
upon the legislature's responsibility of making the finance system meet
constitutional standards. 4' The court limited its decision to defining the
nature of the constitutional mandate and determining whether that mandate
had been met. 42 Interestingly, the court did require the Texas legislature to
act quickly to bring the school financing system up to constitutional stan-
dards. 43 To date, the legislature has failed to formulate a new method of
financing public schools which has been met with judicial approval.
44
34. 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989).
35. Id. at 398.
36. Id. at 397. TEx. CoNsT. art. 7, § 1 provides: "A general diffusion of knowledge being
essential to the preservation of the liberties and rights of the people, it shall be the duty of
the legislature of the state to establish and make suitable provision for the support and
maintenance of an efficient system of public, free schools."
37. Edgewood, 777 S.W.2d at 394-95. The court rejected the state's argument that the
term efficient meant "simple and inexpensive," and instead found that legislative intent clearly
showed that the term connoted "the use of resources so as to produce results with little
waste ..... " Id.
38. Id. at 396.
39. Id. at 397. The court did refer to the issue of equality when stating that "not only the
legislature, but also this court has previously recognized the implicit link that the Texas
Constitution establishes between efficiency and equality." Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 399.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. N.Y. Times, Sept. 26, 1990, at C5, col. 4. Under judicial order, the Texas legislature
1991]
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In Rose v. Council for Better Education ,4 the Supreme Court of Kentucky
similarly followed Edgewood in declaring the entire system of common
schools in Kentucky to be unconstitutional. 46 The clause of the Kentucky
constitution upon which the Rose court based its decision provides: "The
General Assembly shall, by appropriate legislation, provide for an efficient
system of common schools throughout the State." ' 47 In defining the term
"efficienti" the court listed the requirement of establishing uniformity
among school districts, the constitutional right of all children to an adequate
education, and the necessity of providing equal educational opportunities
to all, regardless of place of residence or economic circumstance. 4 The Rose
court went one step further than Edgewood when it recognized education
as a basic, fundameital right in Kentucky. 49
E dgewood and Rose illustrate the tremendous discretion which state courts
have in interpreting constitutional provisions. Courts have been forced to
reject equal protection challenges in school financing litigation because of
the difficulty in achieving absolute funding equality. Nevertheless, many
courts faced with evidence of large funding disparities have felt compelled
to rely on other constitutional provisions as a basis for enacting meaningful
change in public education. °
C. Maintenance and Support of a Free Education System
Some jurisdictions have upheld existing state school financing systems
against claims of violations of equal protection clauses or education pro-
visions of state constitutions. For example, Board of Education, Levittown
v. Nyquist5' held that the system for financing public schools in New York
did not violate either the federal or state constitutions' equal protection
clauses or the education provision of the state constitution. 2
44. N.Y. Times, Sept. 26, 1990, at C5, col. 4. Under judicial order, the Texas legislature
enacted changes to the financing system during special sessions in the spring of 1990. Despite
those changes, a lower court struck down the legislature's new plan, which added $528 million
to school financing through raised taxes. The lower court ruled that the system was still
inadequate to ensure proper funding for property-poor school districts.
45. 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989).
46. Id. at 215.
47. Id. at 190; see KY. CONST. § 183.
48. Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 208-15.
49. Id. at 206.
50. See Helena Elementary School Dist. No. I v. State, 769 P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989); Rose
v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989); Dupree v. Alma School Dist. No.
30, 279 Ark. 340, 651 S.W.2d 90 (1983); Washakie County School Dist. No. 1 v. Herschler,
606 P.2d 310 (Wyo.), cerl. denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980); Pauley v. Kelly, 162 W. Va. 672, 255
S.E.2d 859 (1979); Seattle School Dist. No. 1 v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 585 P.2d 71 (1979);
Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 376 A.2d 359 (1977); Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 303
A.2d 273, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973); Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241,
96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
51. 57 N.Y.2d 27, 453 N.Y.S.2d 643, 439 N.E.2d 359 (1982).
52. Id., 439 N.E.2d at 368. In addressing the issue of the violation of the United States




Nyquist's analysis and interpretation of the education article of New
York's constitution provides helpful insight into the possible judicial inter-
pretation of Oklahoma's constitution because of the substantial similarity
between New York's education article and the education provisions of the
Oklahoma constitution. New York's education article states: "The legislature
shall provide for the maintenance and support of a system of free common
schools, wherein all the children of this state may be educated. ' 53 Nyquist
pointed out that the language of the education article did not require
education to be equal or even substantially equivalent in every district.
54
In analyzing the term "system" as used in the education article, Nyquist
reasoned that financial support measures could not be considered a "system"
as the term was used by the framers of the New York constitution. 5  Instead,
a "system" refers to school attendance rules, required courses, teacher
qualifications, pupil transportation and other matters which make up the
education program of the state.56
Accordingly, the court held if those standards are maintained and sup-
ported then the constitutional mandate under the education article is satis-
fied.57 Nyquist concluded that, because the average per-pupil expenditure in
New York exceeds all other states but two, a sound, basic education was
being provided as required under the education article of the state consti-
tution."a
Two important facts should be emphasized about Nyquist's decision to
uphold New York's system of school finance. First, per-student spending
in New York was higher than in most other states. That evidence persuaded
the Nyquist court that New York's school financing system met constitu-
tional standards. If per-pupil expenditures in New York were lower than in
most states, the court might have been compelled to hold differently.
Secondly, the Nyquist plaintiffs based their allegations on the fact that
New York was not providing an equal distribution of school funds.59 As
noted earlier, courts are reluctant to require state legislatures to meet the
almost impossible standard of absolute equality in school funding. 60 This
reluctance might partially explain Nyquist's decision to uphold the validity
of New York's system of school finance against the plaintiffs' claims.
finance in New York was reasonably related to a legitimate state purpose of maintaining local
control over public education. Accordingly, the court found that the system was not in violation
of either the state or federal constitution's equal protection clauses. Id., 439 N.E.2d at 366.
53. N.Y. CoNsT, art. XI, § 1, quoted in Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d at 368. OKLA. CONST. art.
XIII, § I provides that "[t]he Legislature shall establish and maintain a system of free public
school wherein all the children of the State may be educated."
54. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d at 368.
55. Id.
56. Id., 439 N.E.2d at 369.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id., 439 N.E.2d at 361.
60. See supra notes 1, 39.
1991]
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The California, Texas, Kentucky, and New York cases discussed above
illustrate the different approaches being taken by many of the states in the
nation. In each of the four cases, the courts relied strongly on their own
interpretations of the somewhat ambiguous language of the applicable state
constitutional provisions.
II. The Current Status of Oklahoma's Educational System
In recent years, many of Oklahoma's residents, educators, and politicians
have become increasingly concerned over the quality of public education
provided to Oklahoma's schoolchildren. This concern is reflected not only
in the political arena, but also in the Oklahoma judiciary.
Several lawsuits relating to the issue of the effectiveness of the school
finance system have been brought by school districts and parents who are
concerned with the large fiscal inequities which exist between the school
districts. Fair School Finance Council v. Oklahoma (Fair School 11)61 rep-
resents a recent attempt by educators to force the state to lessen the fiscal
disparities between the school districts and to provide adequate educational
opportunities for Oklahoma's schoolchildren.
A. The Structure of the Oklahoma School Financing System
Public education in Oklahoma is financed by a combination of local,
state, and federal resources. The primary portion of funding stems from
levies on real and personal properties within the school districts. 62 Under
the Oklahoma constitution, revenues from ad valorem63 taxation must be
apportioned among school districts based upon the legal average daily
attendance for the preceding school year.64 The school districts are also
allowed to levy ad valorem taxes. The Oklahoma constitution provides that
any school district, upon certification of need by the Board of Education,
can levy an additional tax of fifteen mills on all taxable property.63
Because the system of local financing is based upon ad valorem taxes,
the amount of revenues available for funding education varies greatly be-
tween school districts. Districts located in high property value areas have
arguably greater financial resources and greater per capita spending per
pupil than those schools in property-poor districts.66
The state is another primary source of funding for public education in
Oklahoma. 67 Oklahoma gives portions of the revenues generated from gross
production taxes, motor vehicle license and registration fees, and rural
61. No. CJ-90-7165 (D. Okla. filed Sept. 6, 1990).
62. Fair School Fin. Council v. State, 746 P.2d 1135, 1138 (Okla. 1987) (Fair School 1).
63. An ad valorem tax is a tax imposed on the value of property.
64. OKLA. CONST. art. 10, § 9(b).
65. Fair School I, 7446 P.2d at 1138; see OKLA. CoNsr. art. 10, § 9(c). The term "mill"
means one-tenth of one cent. Many states use a mill rate to compute property taxes.
66. Plaintiff's Petition at 11, Fair School Fin. Council of Oklahoma, No. CJ-90-7165 (D.
Okla. filed Sept. 6, 1990) (Fair School I1).




electric cooperative taxes to school districts. 61 Two state programs, Foun-
dation Program Aid and Incentive Aid, also dedicate funds to enable each
school district to provide a basic education for the children of the district.
69
There are, however, limits to the amounts each school district may receive
from these programs.70 While the allocation of resources from the programs
could be used to close the funding gap between property-rich and property-
poor districts, limitations placed upon the minimum and maximum amounts
of funding which each district can receive reduce the effectiveness of these
programs.
7'
The federal government is the third source of revenue for financing
Oklahoma public schools. 72 However, federal monies are often restricted to
specific uses and classes of people . 7 For-that reason, federal funds are not
very useful in reducing fiscal disparities among districts.74
B. The Effectiveness of the Oklahoma School System
Recent United States Department of Education statistics ranked Oklahoma
below a majority of the fifty states in average per-pupil expenditures,
estimated average teacher salaries, advanced placement programs, and av-
erage ACT 75 achievement test scores. 76 Concern over the condition of the
education system prompted members of the Oklahoma legislature to intro-
duce House Bill 1017 into legislation. 7  As enacted, the new education
legislation set new curriculum standards, limited class sizes, set new teacher
salary requirements and performance standards, and potentially equalized
funding among Oklahoma's 595 public school districts by distributing ad-
ditional tax revenues to school districts.
7
1
To pay for the reforms, the new legislation provides for increases in
corporate income taxes, state sales and use tax rates, personal income taxes,
68. Plaintiff's Petition at 6, Fair School 11 (No. CJ-90-7165).






75. ACT stands for the American College Testing program, which gives college entrance
exams to high school students.
76. Plaintiff's Petition at 8, Fair School II (No. CJ-90-7165). The United States Department
of Education statistics ranked Oklahoma forty-fourth among the fifty states and the District
of Columbia in average per-pupil expenditure in 1988. Oklahoma ranked below every state
bordering Oklahoma except Arkansas. The estimated average teacher salary for 1989 in
Oklahoma ranked forty-ninth in the nation. Oklahoma also ranked below every bordering state
and the majority of other states in the percentage of schools offering advanced placement
programs to students. In average ACT achievement test scores for 1989, Oklahoma ranked
twenty-fourth out of twenty-eight states.
77. Daily Oklahoman, Sept. 7, 1990, at Al, col. 5. House Bill 1017 went into effect in
1991.
78. See 70 OKLA. STAT. § 18-114.1 to -114.7 (Supp. 1992) (salary); id. § 18-113.1 to -113.3
(class size); id. §§ 18-200 to -201, 18-300, 18-400 (additional funding); id. § 6-101.21 to -101.29
(performance standards); id. § 11-103.4 to -103.10 (curriculum).
1991]
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and other revenue raising measures. 79 Nevertheless, critics of the education
law argue that the additional revenues provided for in the legislation are
not adequate to allow school districts to satisfy the education legislation's
other requirements of increased teacher salaries and new class size limita-
tions.80
1. School Finance Litigation in Oklahoma
Two Oklahoma cases deal with the validity of the school financing system
under the state constitution. Fair School Finance Council v. State (Fair
School 1)8" addressed the issue of whether the school financing system
satisfied the constitutional mandates of the equal protection clauses of the
federal and state constitution.82 Fair School Finance Council v. Oklahoma
(Fair School 11)83 challenges the constitutionality of the financing system on
grounds other than equal protection.
A. Fair School I
In 1980, an Oklahoma non-profit corporation consisting of the boards of
education of thirty-eight school districts brought an action against the state
of Oklahoma and other state officials, alleging that Oklahoma's system of
financing public schools violated the equal protection clause of both the
federal and state constitutions. 84 Following Rodriguez, the Oklahoma Su-
preme Court concluded that the equal protection clause of the federal
Constitution does not require Oklahoma's school financing system to guar-
antee equal expenditures per child.85 However, the court found that the
Rodriguez test for determining whether education is a fundamental right is
inappropriate when determining whether education is a fundamental right
under Oklahoma's constitution. 86
Under the restricted authority and delegated powers of the United States
Constitution, Congress may only do what the federal Constitution has
granted it the power to do. 87 Conversely, in Oklahoma, the state's authority
is not strictly limited to what is explicitly or implicitly provided for in the
state constitution.8 8 Accordingly, the mere fact that education is specifically
mentioned and provided for in the Oklahoma constitution does not neces-
sarily mean that education is a fundamental right. 89
79. Daily Oklahoman, Sept. 7, 1990, at Al, col. 5.
80. Fair School Fin. Council v. Oklahoma, No. CJ-90-7165 (D. Okla. filed Sept. 6, 1990)
(Fair School 11).
81. 746 P.2d 1135 (Okla. 1987).
82. Id. at 1141.
83. No. CJ-90-7165 (D. Okla. filed Sept. 6, 1990) (Fair School fl).
84. Fair School I, 746 P.2d at .1138.
85. Id. at 1147.
86. Id. at 1148-49. See supra notes -13-14.
87. Fair School 1, 746 P.2d at 1149.
88. Id.




Based upon a review of the Oklahoma constitution, Fair School I ulti-
mately rejected the idea that equal educational opportunity, in the sense of
equal expenditures per pupil, is guaranteed by express terms of the Okla-
homa constitution. ° However, the court left some leeway for future chal-
lenges against the Oklahoma finance system when it stated that the constitution
does guarantee "a basic, adequate education according to the standards that
may be established by the State Board of Education." 91
Fair School I emphasized the limited nature of the judiciary's role in
strictly scrutinizing or modifying the state's school financing system, noting
that Oklahoma's constitution places very few restrictions on the legislature's
power to provide a school system for the state. 92 When the constitutionality
of a legislative act is in question, all reasonable doubt will be resolved in
favor of finding the act valid. 93 Only if the legislature acted arbitrarily and
capriciously will the act be declared unconstitutional. 94 In following the
arbitrary and capricious standard, the court determined that the Oklahoma
school finance system is constitutionally valid under the equal protection
clause of the state constitution.95
B. Fair School II
The plaintiff in Fair School II seeks a declaratory judgment and injunctive
relief against the continued operation of the statutory scheme that provides
the financing for Oklahoma's public schools. 96 The plaintiff asserts that,
under the existing statutory scheme of financing public schools in Oklahoma,
children are being denied their constitutional right to a free, adequate
education. 97
The basis for the plaintiff's allegation is found in the provisions of the
Oklahoma constitution which require the Oklahoma legislature to establish
a system of free public education available to all the children of the state. 98
The plaintiff also relies on the statement made by the court in Fair School
I which hinted that the school financing scheme might be found constitu-
tionally invalid if any child in Oklahoma is deprived of an "adequate"
education. 99 In support of its claim that the educational system in Oklahoma
is inadequate, the plaintiff cites the lack of adequate funding of school
districts. '°
90. Fair School I, 746 P.2d at 1149.
91. Id. This statement by the court paved the way for Fair School I.




96. Plaintiff's Petition at 12, Fair School II (No. CJ-90-7165).
97. Id. at 10.
98. OKLA. CONST. art. 1, § 5; id. art. 13, § 1.
99. Fair School 1, 746 P.2d at 1149.
100. Plaintiff's Petition at 8, Fair School II (No. CJ-90-7165). According to the plaintiff's
petition, the Oklahoma school districts are already levying the maximum amounts of local ad
valorem taxes that are constitutionally permissible. The state and federal funding has not fully
1991]
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V. The Issues in Fair School 11
There are three major questions which should be addressed by the court
in Fair School Ii. The first question involves the interpretation of the term
"adequate" as used by Justice Opala in the Fair School I opinion. The
second question is whether maintaining local control over education should
remain a primary objective of Oklahoma's public school system. The final
question raised by Fair School II is whether the court can and should
encroach upon the authority of the legislative branch by mandating that the
legislature change Oklahoma's scheme of school finance.
The answer to the above three questions should provide the Fair School
11 court with the basis for its decision as to whether the Oklahoma consti-
tution requires Oklahoma to provide school children with an adequate
education. The answer to those three issues will also determine whether, if
required, such a constitutional mandate is presently being met by Oklahoma's
existing system of school finance.
A. Adequate Education
The plaintiff in Fair School II alleges that the existing school financing
system is not providing the children of Oklahoma with an adequate edu-
cation as required by the education articles of the state constitution.'0 '
However, the drafters of Oklahoma's constitution did not use the term
"adequate" in those constitutional provisions. The education articles simply
provide for the establishment and maintenance of a system of public schools
in which all of the children of the state may be educated. 02 The need to
define the term "adequate" for purposes of the Fair School 11 litigation
stems from Justice Opala's use of that term in Fair School .10°
Although Fair School I implied in dicta that an adequate education might
be a requirement under the state constitution, the education articles of
Oklahoma's constitution provide little guidance as to the specific obligations
of the legislature in establishing a system of public schools. When analyzing
the language in a similar provision of the New York constitution, Board of
Education, Levittown v. Nyquist found that the term "system" did not
compensated for inadequate local resources. Federal funds are limited to specific uses, and
state funds are ineffective because of various statutory limitations. Although House Bill 1017
attempts to reform many problem areas within the education system, the plaintiff alleges that
the measures to fund the reforms do not sufficiently meet the increased financial burden
created by the education bill. House Bill 1017 reduces teacher-pupil ratios, raises minimum
teacher salaries, and sets new accreditation standards. See supra note 78.
101. Plaintiff's Petition at 12, Fair School IH (No. CJ-90-7165).
102. OKLA. CONST. art. 1, § 5; id. art. 13, § 1.
103. See supra note 99. Fair School I stated that the statutory scheme of financing schools
could be constitutionally invalid if the system completely denied children an education or did
not provide an "adequate" education. The court pointed out that the plaintiffs in Fair School
I did not allege a complete denial of education nor an inadequate one. In fact, the plaintiffs
admitted that "no children were in imminent danger of receiving a wholly inadequate educa-




refer to school financing but instead refered to standards such as required
courses, teacher qualifications, school attendance rules, pupil transportation,
and other matters.1°4
However, the Nyquist reasoning is flawed. A school funding plan is a
necessary element in maintaining educational standards. If sufficient funding
is uuavailable to school districts, they will be unable to provide, among
other things, qualified teachers, adequate transportation, computers, and
adequate class space. For that reason, Fair School II should not adopt a
Nyquist-type analysis of Oklahoma's education provisions. Because of the
ambiguity of the education articles of the constitution, "adequacy" is an
appropriate standard for measuring the constitutionality of Oklahoma's
system of public schools.
The question still exists as to the appropriate test to be used for deter-
mining whether an adequate education is being provided to all school
children in Oklahoma. Some courts have found that the test for the adequacy
of an education system is whether it provides children with basic minimal
skills to allow them to become useful citizens'0 5 or to permit the enjoyment
of free speech and participation in the political process. 06
However, such a minimal standard of education would be extremely
detrimental to Oklahoma. The future of a state depends upon the knowledge
and skill of its citizens. The primary goal of educators, politicians, and
courts should be to provide children with the education and skills necessary
to allow them to compete and survive in an emerging global economy and
in an increasingly complex political and social climate. Oklahoma needs
citizens who have adequate communication and business skills to enable
them to foster industrial, business, and political development in Oklahoma.
Providing Oklahoma's children with an education which simply allows a
person to enjoy freedom of speech or to become a useful citizen would not
even come close to accomplishing that goal.
The appropriate test of an adequate education which should be adopted
by Fair School II was outlined in Rose v. Council for Better Education.0 7
First, an adequate education should provide children with sufficient com-
munication skills and knowledge of political, economic, and social systems
to enable them to be active participants in the political and social devel-
opment of the state. In addition, children should be provided with the
knowledge and skills necessary to enable them to pursue life work intelli-
gently. Finally, public education should provide sufficient levels of academic
or vocational skills to enable public school students to compete favorably
104. Board of Educ., Levittown v. Nyquist, 57 N.Y.2d 27, 453 N.Y.S.2d 643, 439 N.E.2d
359, 368-69 (1982).
105. Fair School I, 746 P.2d at 1149; see Millers v. Childers, 107 Okla. 57, 238 P. 204,
206 (1924).
106. Rodriguez v. San Antonio Indep. School Dist., 411 U.S. 1, 38 (1973).
107. 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989). The court reasoned that the use of the term "efficient"
in the Kentucky constitution signified that Kentucky had an obligation to provide sufficient
school funding to give the children of Kentucky an adequate education. See supra note 48.
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with their counterparts in surrounding states, academically and in the job
market."0 8
The most important of the above-mentioned criteria is the ability of
students to compete against their peers in the job market and in academics.
The reason for its significance is that such a standard would be the best
indicator that uniformity of opportunity of education is being provided.
Uniformity of opportunity has been recognized by the Oklahoma judiciary
as a primary goal of an education system.' 9
If Fair School 11 adopts the above-described test for adequacy, the next
step is to determine whether Oklahoma's existing system of school finance
is presently allowing the state to provide an adequate education to all of
Oklahoma's schoolchildren. The statistics presented by the plaintiff in Fair
School 11 illustrate that Oklahoma ranked far below most states in per-
pupil expenditures, teacher salaries, advanced placement programs, and
scholastic achievement tests." 0
Each one of the statistics cited in the Fair School II petition indicates
that the Oklahoma system of public schools is not presently providing an
adequate education to the state's schoolchildren. By ranking below a ma-
jority of other states in per-pupil expenditure, many districts in Oklahoma
do and will lack the necessary resources to provide children with sufficient
classroom space, textbooks, teachers, counselors, computers, and curricula
to meet the requirements of basic education on a level equal with that of
other states."' By not paying competitive teacher salaries, Oklahoma school
108. Id. at 212. According to Rose, an adequate education is one which has the ability to
provide children with the following seven capacities: 1) sufficient communication skills to
enable a student to function in a complex civilization; 2) sufficient knowledge of political,
economic, and social systems to allow a student to make informed choices; 3) sufficient
understanding of governmental processes to enable a student to understand issues that affect
his or her community; 4) self-knowledge and knowledge of his or her mental and physical
well-being; 5) an exposure to the arts to enable a student to appreciate his or her cultural or
historical heritage; 6) sufficient training in academic or vocational fields to allow a student to
pursue life work intelligently; and 7) sufficient levels of academic or vocational skills to enable
public school students to compete favorably with their counterparts in surrounding states, in
academics or in the job market. Id.
109. Fair School I, 746 P.2d at 1149; see School Dist. No. 25 v. Hodge, 199 Okla. 81, 183
P.2d 575 (1947).
110. See supra note 76.
111. See generally Van Fleet & Boardman, The Relationship Between Revenue Allocations
and Educational Need as Reflected by Achievement Test Scores, in STATUS AND IMPACT OF
EDUCAToNAL FiNANCE PROGRAMS 293, 303-09 (National Education Finance Project 1971).
Studies have indicated the correlation between total revenue allocations per pupil and higher
achievement levels. It is thus reasonable to assume that more financial expenditure produces
greater educational achievement. One study showed that schools with low expenditures are
limited in many aspects. Those schools have a narrow range of subjects taught, inadequate
instructional equipment, insufficient supplies, poor facilities, and unsatisfactory working con-
ditions for students and teachers. See Robinson & Protheroe, Cost of Education: An Investment
in America's Future, in ERS REPORT at 34 (Educational Research Service 1987).
However, there are a number of additional factors which contribute to the quality of
education, including socioeconomic status and the cultural level of the students' parents. The




districts will be unable to hire the most qualified teachers to educate the
state's children. Most significantly, the scholastic achievement test scores
persuasively illustrate that Oklahoma's schoolchildren are and will be at a
competitive disadvantage in academics and in the job market." 2
The statistics clearly show that, in failing to lessen the disparities in school
funding and to increase per-pupil spending in Oklahoma, the state is de-
priving children of the skills necessary to function in today's society. Edu-
cation is a vital part of Oklahoma's future development and should be
recognized as such by the state legislature and the judiciary. Accordingly,
the court in Fair School II must find that providing an adequate education
is a state constitutional requirement. Furthermore, the court must find that
the existing statutory scheme in Oklahoma does not presently provide an
adequate education to all children of the state.
B. Maintaining Local Control over Education
Before demanding that the Oklahoma legislature come up with a new
method of financing public schools, Fair School II must first decide if
legislative changes to the school financing system will undermine a legitimate
state purpose of maintaining local control over education. The concern is
that, in order to rectify the funding disparities caused by the existing system
of local ad valorem taxation, the state must take a more active role in
maintaining Oklahoma's school system. Giving the state more responsibility
in funding education necessarily affects the fundamental principle of main-
taining local control over education."3
Undeniably, maintaining local control over education is a primary objec-
tive of the Oklahoma system of public schools.1 4 Since the enactment of
the first system of public schools, the initiative for the maintainance of
schools has been vested in local citizens because they are the ones most
directly affected by the education system."' Maintaining local control over
education has long been recognized as a legitimate state purpose which is
rationally related to the method of financing schools through the use of
local property taxes."
6
ment has created some skepticism over the need for higher educational expenditures in order
to achieve better educational opportunities for children.
112. Scholastic Aptitude Test scores such as the ACT have frequently been used to measure
the effectiveness of public schools. However, there is an argument that for achievement test
scores to be an adequate measure of the success of education and of the effects of increased
per-pupil expenditures, it is necessary that the test scores used reflect the achievements of all
students and not just those planning to go to college. See Robinson & Protheroe, supra note
Ill.
113. Rodriguez v. San Antonio Indep. School Dist., 411 U.S. 1, 55 (1973).
114. Fair School I, 746 P.2d at 1146. Fair School I acknowledged that encouraging local
participation and control over education is a primary objective underlying the Oklahoma school
financing system. The court pointed out that an article of the School Code expressly mentions
the goal of strengthening and encouraging local responsibility for public education. Id.; see 70
OKLA. STAT. § 18-101(2).
115. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 55.
116. See supra note 17.
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However, the persons who created the public school system in Oklahoma
probably never contemplated the gross disparities which currently exist
among the school districts. How can the principle of maintaining local
control over education remain a legitimate public purpose when a large
portion of the children of the state are being deprived of an adequate
education?
A new method of financing public schools would not necessarily take
away the local districts' power to make decisions as to how to spend school
funds received. For instance, the Oklahoma legislature might decide to
implement a state funding pool in response to a judicial mandate. The plan
could authorize individual districts to collect an additional amount over the
districts' property valuations and to use that enrichment money as they
choose. 117 This option to supplement state funding might have the effect of
silencing the critics of education reform who worry that an attempt to
equalize the distribution of funds would hurt those districts which currently
provide good educational opportunities for their students.
After balancing the need to maintain local control with the need to
adequately educate the state's children, Fair School II should conclude that
the state's objective of maintaining local control over education is not being
furthered by the state's school finance scheme. The benefits of permitting
local districts to have total control over educational standards such as school
curricula and teacher qualifications are unquestionable. However, those
benefits are meaningless if local districts do not have enough funding to
provide children with an adequate education.
The primary objective of the public school system must be in educating
the state's children, not simply allowing local districts the power of decision
making. Society has rapidly changed since the time of the enactment of
Oklahoma's first public school system. The structure of the school system
should be revised to reflect those changes.
Education has become more complex with increases in the student pop-
ulation and greater needs for qualified teachers and equipment in an age
of computer technology. In order to allow Oklahoma children to compete
in the national and international sphere, education must receive greater
funding than that currently provided to local districts.
If the only way to improve Oklahoma's education system is by allowing
the state to take a more active role in financing public schools, then Fair
School 11 needs to take the decisive step of bringing about changes in the
state school financing scheme. The Serrano, Edgewood, and Rose decisions
should persuade the Fair School II court that the principle of maintaining
local control over education is not an insurmountable obstacle to enacting
meaningful change in public education.
In fact, by creating an improved system of public schools, the state will
actually allow local school districts to have more control instead of less." 8
117. A state funding pool with an enrichment program is the new method of school finance
which has been proposed by the Texas legislators in response to the Edgewood decision.




The increased economic alternatives created by a more efficient system of
schools would allow a local community to exercise the control of making
choices it might not have had while under the financial constraints of the
existing system of school finance.11 9
C. Judicial Authority
The third major question which will need to be addressed in Fair School
II involves the defendants' claim that, because the judiciary has limited
powers, the court cannot grant the relief requested by the plaintiff. The
defendants allege that the court cannot mandate the Oklahoma legislature
to enact specific legislation or to increase taxes.
120
The Oklahoma judiciary has already recognized the broad authority of
the state legislature to formulate a system and method for financing public
schools. 12 1 However, the judiciary has the equally important responsibility
of monitoring legislative actions to make sure legislative acts are in com-
pliance with constitutional standards. That judicial responsibility must in-
clude ordering the legislature to increase taxes or to enact legislation if such
action is needed to comply with the state's laws.
Federal case law has recently made it clear that federal courts have the
judicial authority to order local governments to levy their own taxes. 122 As
long as there is a basis in the United States Constitution for not observing
a state statutory limitation, federal courts may require local governments
to levy taxes in excess of the amount set by state statutes.
2 3
By analogy, state courts have a similar authority to force local govern-
ments to levy taxes or to enact legislation as long as there is a constitutional
basis for the court order. Accordingly, the court in Fair School II should
have the judicial authority to order the Oklahoma legislature to amend the
statutory scheme of the school funding system.
Several state courts have been willing to take an aggressive stance in
ordering the legislature to enact changes to school financing systems. 124
Although some of those courts have declared themselves reluctant to en-
croach upon legislative authority, the courts have nevertheless felt compelled
by school funding inequities to mandate legislative action. The common
thread between those cases is that the courts have found some constitutional
119. Id.
120. See Defendants' Answer to Plaintiff's Petition. The defendants in Fair School II have
not discussed the issue of the alleged "inadequacy" of the existing education system. Nor have
they addressed the issue of the state purpose of maintaining local control. They did, however,
raise several affirmative defenses. Along with the procedural defenses of lack of standing, res
judicata and collateral estoppel, the defendants' primary affirmative defense is questioning the
judicial authority of the court to require legislative action. Id.
121. See supra note 92.
122. Missouri v. Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. 1651, 1666 (1990). Jenkins involved school desegregation.
The Court discussed in detail the scope of federal judicial power as relating to setting aside
state-imposed limitations on taxing authority.
123. Id.
124. See Edgewood Indep. School Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989); Serrano v.
Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d 929, 931, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345, 357 (1976).
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basis, depending on the courts' own broad interpretations of the states'
constitutions, for mandating the legislative changes.
In Fair School .I, a judicial order requiring the legislature to formulate
a new statutory scheme of school finance would be the most effective and
expedient method of ensuring a meaningful improvement in Oklahoma
public schools. The Fair School 11 court should allow the legislature to
decide which changes need to be made. However, the court needs to closely
review the legislature's actions to ensure that the new statutory scheme
provides Oklahoma's children with an adequate education.
Despite the clear advantages of the judiciary taking an active role in
creating a system of public schools which would provide children with an
adequate education, the court, in Fair School II, might find that the
Oklahoma legislature has acted within its discretion. The court will probably
find for the defendants in Fair School 11 for the following reasons. First,
there is some uncertainty about whether or not Fair School II will conclude
that the existing system of school finance does not provide children in
Oklahoma with an adequate education. The court could conclude that
because Oklahoma's public schools are able to provide students with the
minimal skills necessary to become useful citizens, the constitutional mandate
of the education articles is satisfied.
The second reason why the court will likely find for the defendants is
the court's statement in Fair School I that the court was reluctant to
encroach upon legislative authority. Fair School I made it clear that unless
the legislature acted arbitrarily and capriciously, all reasonable doubt would
be resolved in favor of finding the financing system constitutional. 2 Because
the Oklahoma constitution is somewhat ambiguous as to what is required
by the legislature in creating a system of public schools, the court will have
difficulty finding that the legislature acted arbitrarily and capriciously.
The third reason the plaintiff in Fair School 11 may not prevail in the
present lawsuit is that the legislature has recently passed House Bill 1017.126
The new legislation, which provides for additional funding as well as
structural changes to the school system, could have significant impact on
the existing system of public schools. The court might decide that because
the legislature has taken action on its own, it would be better to determine
the effect of the new legislation before overburdening the state with a
judicial requirement of additional funding.
Conclusion
Every state has its own constitutional provisons which allow for the
establishment of a public education system. The language of those provisions
has been the frequent subject of challenges to the constitutionality of school
financing statutes.
125. See supra notes 94-95.




In Oklahoma, the equal distribution of school funding is not a requirement
of the state constitution. However, providing an adequate education for all
children should be within the mandate of the Oklahoma constitution. Okla-
homa's present statutory scheme of school finance has created funding
disparities among school districts. Because of the insufficiency of funds in
many school districts, the skills being provided by public schools in Okla-
homa fail to allow some children to compete favorably with their peers
either academically or in the job market. Therefore, not all of the children
in the state are being provided an adequate education.
The current school funding system in Oklahoma has the actual effect of
minimizing local control over education. Consequently, the present method
of financing public schools can no longer be said to be rationally related
to the state's objective of maintaining local control over education. The
extreme disparaties in the distribution of funds among school districts are
adequate justification for finding that the Oklahoma school financing system
no longer serves a legitimate public purpose. For this reason, Fair School
II should find Oklahoma's statutory financing scheme unconstitutional and
mandate legislative action to achieve a more equitable system.
Oklahoma courts have been previously unwilling to take on a quasi-
legislative role by requiring legislatures to enact or revise legislation. How-
ever, the results of the existing funding disparities among school districts
are so egregious that the judiciary should feel compelled to take an aggressive
stance in mandating legislative change.
Karen Richardson
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